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"BAD FAITH" REFUSAL TO SETTLE BY
LIABILITY INSURERS: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF
THE JUDGMENT-PROOF PROBLEM
ALAN 0. SYKES*
MOST liability insurance policies contain dollar limits on the insurer's
obligation to pay for covered claims. These policy limits create conflicts
of interest between the insured and the insurer in the conduct of litiga-
tion.' One type of conflict arises when a settlement offer is made by the
plaintiff and the outcome of litigation is uncertain-the insured may wish
to accept the offer because all or most of the burden falls on the insurer,
but the insurer may want to litigate because the cost of adverse judgments
in excess of the policy limits falls on the insured.
Depending on who exercises control over the decision to settle, this
divergence of incentives potentially leads to the litigation of claims that
a first-best contract would require to be settled or to the settlement of
claims that a first-best contract would require to be litigated. The former
problem is thought to be of greater concern in practice because many,
probably most, liability insurance policies provide the insurer with au-
thority to settle claims in conjunction with its obligation to defend them.
For example, one widely utilized standard form commercial liability pol-
icy provides: "We have the right and duty to defend any 'suit' seeking
(covered) damages. But ... [w]e may investigate and settle any claim or
'suit' at our discretion." 2 Similarly, a widely used standard form auto
insurance policy provides: "We will settle or defend, as we consider
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Dan Fischel,
Mark Geistfeld, Steven Shavell, and participants in workshops at the University of Chicago
and George Mason University for many thoughts and suggestions.
For a recent survey of various conflicts that may arise, see Kent D. Syverud, The Duty
to Settle, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1113 (1990).
2 See Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (1984),
reprinted in Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation 440-48, at 442 (1990).
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appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these (covered) damages." 3
These policies appear to afford the insurer unrestricted authority to settle
or litigate claims, save that the insurer seemingly cannot obligate the
insured to pay anything toward settlement without the insured's agree-
ment .
4
Since the early 1900s, these policy provisions have been the subject of
litigation.5 Courts now routinely impose on the insurer some obligation
to consider the interests of the insured notwithstanding the provisions of
the contract. This obligation is sometimes stated as a duty to exercise
"due care" to protect the interests of the insured, to act in "good faith"
with regard to the interests of the insured, or to avoid rejecting settlement
offers in "bad faith."-
6
The precise contours of this obligation still vary somewhat from state
to state, as does the remedy on a finding of liability. But one approach,
enunciated in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.7 has become the most
common.8 The Crisci court held that "the insurer must give the interests
of the insured at least as much consideration as it gives its own interests."
And, "[i]n determining whether an insurer has given consideration to the
interests of the insured, the test is whether a prudent insurer without
policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer." 9
The remedy in Crisci itself included damages for mental distress.'0
Such damages are now disfavored, however, and the usual remedy today
is to impose on the insurer an obligation to pay for the entire judgment
I See Insurance Services Office, Personal Auto Policy (1985), reprinted in Abraham,
supra note 2, at 603-12.
4 This limitation on the authority of the insurer is not express but follows from the
absence of any actual or apparent authority to bind the insured to contribute to settlement.
5 The earliest case imposing limitations on the insurer's discretion in settlement is said
to be Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914). See Robert E.
Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doc-
trines and Commercial Practices 876 (1988).
6 See id. at 880-83 for citations to cases stating each formulation. Actions against an
insurer for failure to take proper account of the interests of the insured may sound in
contract (for breach of an implied term) or in tort (for breach of a duty of care), a distinction
that is of little practical importance in most cases. Id. at 877-79. In some states, the insured
has a choice between the two theories. Id.
7 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967).
s "The Crisci rule is standard law now in most jurisdictions." Abraham, supra note 2,
at 586.
9 66 Cal. 2d at 429. An early advocate of such a rule was Professor, now Judge, Robert
Keeton. See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954).
0 66 Cal. 2d at 432-34.
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against the insured notwithstanding the policy limits." Coupled with this
remedy, an ideally functioning Crisci rule induces the insurer to weigh
the expected liability judgment plus the costs of litigation against the
price of settlement and to choose the least costly option. 2
One might begin by questioning the need for such a rule in a consensual
setting. Granting that insurers rarely negotiate all the terms of contracts
with their insureds on a case-by-case basis, the prevalence of competition
in the industry, a concern for reputation on the part of insurers, and
insurers' desire to maximize customer willingness to pay in relation to
costs all provide an incentive for them to offer jointly optimal terms.
The absence of any contractual obligation to the insured regarding the
disposition of settlement offers then affords some evidence that such an
obligation is undesirable from the parties' perspective.
A case for an extracontractual obligation on the insurer might somehow
rest on the presence of externalities to the contract, 3 but the courts do
not offer this rationale. Instead, they insist that judicial constraints on
the insurer are necessary to protect the insured. For this argument to
have plausibility, one must assume that transaction costs prevent in-
sureds from appreciating the consequences of the standard right-to-settle
clauses ex ante or prevent the inclusion of a jointly optimal provision to
govern settlement. It is by no means clear that such an assumption is
correct. The contractual provisions above, for example, are at least argu-
ably clear on their face in granting sole authority to the insurer to accept
or reject offers within the policy limits and, thus, seem unlikely to mislead
insureds who reflect on them. As to the costs of substituting a better
alternative, standard form provisions in insurance contracts (as else-
where) greatly reduce the costs per customer of including valuable con-
tractual terms, and if a superior provision existed that was appropriate
for all or most insureds, it could readily be incorporated. Even if con-
tracts are "silent" on the matters at issue here, therefore, as some com-
mentators argue,' 4 that silence may reflect heterogeneity across custom-
" Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory and Public Policy
192 (1986).
2 This statement is a bit oversimplistic as it ignores the complications that arise under
the Crisci rule when the settlement offer exceeds the policy limits. These are discussed in
Section II1 below. It also presumes that the courts properly instruct juries to consider not
only the size of the expected judgment in relation to the settlement offer but the defense
costs that would be saved as well. That they do so clearly and consistently may certainly
be doubted. See Syverud, supra note 1, at 1139-41.
13 The discussion in later sections of the article will suggest how externalities may arise
due to the insured's potential insolvency.
14 "The cause of action for bad faith exists in third-party cases because the silence of
insurance policies regarding the insurer's duties in responding to policy limits settlement
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ers that makes a standard form provision inappropriate. If so, the
adoption of any uniformly applicable judicial rule becomes suspect.
The strongest argument to the contrary is that even if insurance cus-
tomers are reasonably homogeneous in their preferences regarding the
insurer's conduct in settlement negotiations, standard form provisions
may not reflect those preferences due to information failures. The typical
contract does not precisely specify how insurers are to respond to settle-
ment offers, and perhaps customers may not appreciate the potential
conflict of interest ex ante. Such information failures are a familiar source
of contractual imperfection and might allow insurers to foist an opportu-
nistic arrangement on some customers in the absence of adequate reputa-
tional constraints or judicial action. Absent judicial constraint, insurers
might behave appropriately in their repeated interactions with sophisti-
cated insureds (such as commercial entities that frequently confront liabil-
ity claims) but take advantage of the unsophisticated insured, particularly
individuals, where onetime gains can exceed any losses from damage to
the long-term relationship.
While remaining agnostic on the optimality of provisions that seemingly
afford the insurer complete discretion in settlement, therefore, this article
inquires what well-informed parties would find efficient under plausible
assumptions about the contracting environment. To the extent that unfet-
tered discretion for the insurer conflicts with or corresponds to what the
economic analysis suggests to be optimal, the inference of contractual
imperfection is accordingly strengthened or weakened, as is the sugges-
tion that the contracts should be viewed as ambiguous or incomplete.
A second inquiry in the article is whether the Crisci rule is the best
response to contractual imperfection, assuming arguendo that it is pres-
ent. Criticisms of contract doctrine for its failure to replicate the first-best
world without transaction costs are often unpersuasive or uninteresting, 5
and that is not the objection to the Crisci rule here.' 6 Rather, the concern
offers forced the courts to fill this gap and define the insurer's responsibilities." Stephen
S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions: Liability and Damages 69, ch. 3 (1992).
15 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-best
World, 19 J. Legal Stud. 43, 46-50 (1990).
6 Even a costless and error-free implementation of the Crisci rule plainly would not
replicate the first best. The insured is risk averse, for example, and thus it is not first best
to evaluate settlement offers solely on the basis of the expected dollar costs of litigation.
Likewise, the insured may well be insolvent with respect to large liability judgments, so
that the expected payment to the plaintiff will often be less than the expected judgment.
The present remedy under the Crisci rule also ignores what the Crisci court itself acknowl-
edged-that insureds may incur psychic costs in litigation as well as monetary costs. But
such observations hardly establish that the Crisci rule is inferior to some feasible alternative.
It is likely impossible to fashion an administrable rule tailored to the degree of the insured's
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relates to the administrative and error costs of the Crisci rule. Crucial
factors in the analysis required-relating to the expected outcome of
litigation ex ante-are plainly quite difficult to reconstruct ex post. Not
only is it essential to determine exactly what information was available
to the insurer at the time of the settlement negotiation, but it is necessary
to ascertain what a reasonable insurer would have thought to be the
probability distribution of outcomes conditional on that information, a
daunting task in many cases of litigation uncertainty.
Principally for this reason, the question arises whether simpler alterna-
tives to the Crisci rule might be preferable, not necessarily because they
do better at replicating the first best but because they spare the courts a
costly inquiry that can hardly be expected to yield the right answer with
consistency. The most obvious alternative is to permit the insurer to
exercise unfettered discretion in settlement as long as the contract does
not require otherwise. This approach may be termed the "no duty" rule.
An alternative rule, widely discussed by the commentators, is a "strict
liability" rule that holds the insurer liable for the entire judgment irre-
spective of policy limits whenever the insurer has rejected a settlement
offer within the policy limits. 7 This article offers some tentative thoughts
on the question whether either of these simpler options might always or
sometimes dominate the Crisci rule.
Because there is no conflict of interest absent a policy limit, it is appro-
priate to begin the analysis by inquiring why the policy limit arises in the
first place. Unfortunately, there is no single answer to this question,
and I have chosen to focus on only one possibility, albeit an important
one-what Shavell has termed the "judgment-proof problem."' 8 Insureds
with limited assets will not buy unlimited coverage. It does not pay to
buy $1 million worth of liability insurance for a premium of $5,000, for
example, if one's net assets are only $4,000.
The analysis here suggests that when policy limits are attributable to
the limited assets of insureds, either a Crisci rule or a strict liability rule
often benefits insureds for one reason that is obvious (it reduces the
danger that an insurer will inefficiently refuse to settle, thereby putting
the insured at risk of an excess judgment) and for one reason that is not
risk aversion in each case or to the insured's asset level. A remedy that allows mental
distress damages may simply be a license for juries to transfer wealth from unsympathetic
defendants to sympathetic plaintiffs. Criticisms of the Crisci rule from this first-best perspec-
tive thus seem inapt.
" Discussions of the pros and cons of strict liability that do not squarely favor or reject
it may be found in Keeton & Widiss, supra note 5, at 887-89; Syverud, supra note 1, at
1168-72; Abraham, supra note 11, at 193-95.
18 Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 45 (1986).
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(it can increase an insured's ability to externalize liability with little or
no risk). As between the two rules, a plausible case can be made that the
strict liability rule is superior on administrative cost grounds and that
arguments against it have been overstated by the commentators. Because
either the Crisci or strict liability rules may increase the extent to which
judgment-proof insureds externalize liability, however, their social wel-
fare consequences are at least formally ambiguous.
These results cannot be taken as a reliable guide to policy making,
however, not only because of certain indeterminacies, but because other
reasons for policy limits and their implications remain unexplored. Thus,
I provide a piece of the puzzle, but firm conclusions about the wisdom
of bad faith doctrine must await further analytical developments.
Section I discusses the existing literature. Sections II and III develop
a model of the optimal insurance contract between an insurer and a poten-
tially judgment-proof insured, deriving the welfare consequences for the
parties of the no duty rule, the Crisci rule, and the strict liability rule.
Section IV concludes by collecting the central implications of the model,
discussing the importance of its simplifying assumptions, and addressing
the possible divergence between the parties' welfare and social welfare.
I. A NOTE ON THE LITERATURE
To the knowledge of the author, the only other formal analysis of the
conflict of interest in settlement between insurer and insured is contained
in a recent paper by Michael Meurer. 9 Simple numerical examples suffice
to convey the essence of his argument.
Meurer's prospective defendant knows that in the event of an accident,
the injured party can go to court and obtain a judgment. Suppose for
purposes of illustration that the court will set damages at either $10,000
or $50,000, with the probability of each judgment equal to .5. Expected
liability is thus $30,000. Settlement negotiations will occur prior to the
resolution of the uncertainty about liability. Litigation costs in the ab-
sence of settlement are $10,000 for each party. The defendant is able to
pay any judgment against him.
Consider first a risk-neutral defendant without insurance. The expected
gain from litigation to the plaintiff is $20,000, and the expected loss to
the defendant in litigation is $40,000. The $20,000 difference, equal to
combined litigation expenses, represents the joint gains to settlement.
Meurer assumes that the parties always "split the difference" in bar-
19 Michael Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts
between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 502 (1992).
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gaining, so that settlement occurs here at a payment of $30,000, exactly
equal to expected liability.20
Now suppose that the same defendant has purchased an insurance
policy with a $25,000 policy limit. Assume that the insurer now bears the
defense costs of $10,000 and that the policy gives the insurer sole discre-
tion over settlement. Once again, the plaintiff's expected gains from litiga-
tion are $20,000 because the excess judgment over the policy limit will
be collected from the insured. What is the maximum that the insurer will
offer in settlement? Its expected payment under the policy at the conclu-
sion of litigation is .5($10,000) + .5($25,000) = $17,500. If it elects to
litigate, it will also bear defense costs of $10,000 (the insurer bears de-
fense costs because of its duty to defend). Thus, at first blush, it seems
that the insurer would offer up to $27,500 to avoid litigation. In fact,
however, the insurer may be able to fulfill its obligations by tendering
the policy limits of $25,000 and walking away from the matter, 2' and this
amount then represents the upper bound on the insurer's offer. But in
either case, because the plaintiff will settle for amounts over $20,000, a
settlement will be possible. Further, if the insured does not contribute to
the settlement, any amount within the settlement range is plainly below
what the uninsured defendant would have paid to settle ($30,000) under
the split-the-difference assumption. Thus, even without any risk aversion
on the part of the defendant, Meurer argues, insurance is beneficial to
the defendant on these facts because it delegates the authority to bargain
to the insurer who rationally refuses to pay as much as the insured might
have to pay in the absence of insurance. The plaintiff nevertheless settles
because the expected outcome of litigation is even less favorable, and
the defendant benefits ex ante because the competitively determined in-
surance premium is less than the expected judgment in the absence of
insurance.
Delegation of authority to the insurer is a two-edged sword, however,
as the following modified hypothetical suggests. Suppose now that the
liability judgment will equal either $20,000 or $100,000, again with proba-
bility .5 for each outcome. The policy limit is assumed to be $50,000 and
litigation costs are as before. Plaintiff's expected gain from litigation is
$50,000, yet insurer's expected loss in litigation is only .5($20,000) +
.5($50,000) + $10,000 = $45,000. Settlement here is impossible on the
assumption that the insured cannot be induced to contribute. If this situa-
tion were sure to materialize after an accident, the purchase of insurance
20 That is, the plaintiff receives a settlement equal to its "threat point" of $20,000 plus
half the joint gains.
21 See, for example, the standard form contracts quoted in the introduction.
HeinOnline  -- 23 J. Legal Stud. 83 1994
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
with the insurer in charge of settlement would be disadvantageous to the
prospective defendant ex ante because the defendant not only would bear
the full expected judgment (through a combination of insurance premiums
and stochastic ex post liability in excess of policy limits) but also would
have to pay a premium to cover the insurer's expected litigation costs.
Of course, these cases of undesired litigation are precisely the reason for
disputes such as Crisci.
Because the insured chooses the policy limit and thus has an opportu-
nity to optimally balance gains in bargaining against costs from inefficient
litigation, however, Meurer contends (and demonstrates in his model)
that a risk-neutral insured can always find a level of coverage that is
preferable to self-insurance and that many risk-averse insureds can as
well. Hence, he argues that the delegation of settlement authority to the
insurer is often optimal for parties to an insurance contract and that
lawsuits after the fact by disappointed insureds represent an effort to
renege on an implicit bargain.
The Crisci rule functions in Meurer's model to force the insurer to
settle on more generous terms and thus reduces the welfare of the insured
ex ante. Because the insurer will be liable to the insured for rejecting an
offer if the expected costs in litigation exceed the offer, the insurer's
threat point is the same as that of a solvent, uninsured, risk-neutral defen-
dant. Meurer's split-the-difference assumption then leads to the insurer's
settling for the same amount as the uninsured risk-neutral defendant, and
the bargaining advantage of delegating settlement authority to the insurer
is lost.
Meurer argues that the Crisci rule is nevertheless socially desirable for
three reasons: (1) it eliminates the danger of socially inefficient litigation
as in the second case described above; (2) under the assumption that the
insured is risk averse, it eliminates the incentive for the insured to take
on excessive amounts of risk through policy limits that increase bar-
gaining power in settlement; and (3) under the assumption that expected
judgments equal the expected social costs of accidents, it induces optimal
caretaking ex ante by prospective injurers.
Meurer's analysis is intriguing but is subject to several objections.
First, if the no duty rule is indeed superior from the parties' perspective,
we might expect efforts to contract around the Crisci rule through the
creation of crystal clear provisions that eliminate any arguable ambiguity
regarding the insurer's sole discretion in settlement. At least between an
insurer and a sophisticated, commercial insured, such provisions would
have a reasonable chance of being enforced, yet they do not appear to
have been forthcoming.
A second objection relates to a questionable assumption in Meurer's
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analysis, crucial to the results-that the insured does not participate in
settlement negotiations even when it might be in its interest to do so and
even when it might be in the plaintiffs interest to draw the insured into
the negotiations.22 In the first case discussed above, for example, it is
plausible that the plaintiff would undertake to bargain not only with the
insurer but also with the insured. Rather than settling for some amount
below the insurer's maximum offer, the plaintiff might hold out for some
amount that required a contribution from the insured, who on the hypo-
thetical facts faces considerable exposure in the event that settlement
negotiations break down. Similar intervention by the insured might pre-
vent the inefficient litigation described in the second case. Indeed,
Meurer himself analyzes instances in which the insurer concludes a settle-
ment that obligates the insured to contribute, even though contractual
authority to do so apparently does not exist in insurance contracts and
thus any such settlement would require participation of the insured in the
settlement negotiations.23 And, once the insured participates, the bar-
gaining advantage purportedly created through delegation of bargaining
authority seemingly disappears.
Meurer acknowledges the problem briefly and responds by suggesting
that when the contract affords the insurer sole discretion in settlement,
the insurer will refuse to allow the insured to participate in settlement
negotiations in any manner to maintain a reputation for being a tough
bargainer.2 4 It is not clear that this response is satisfactory-if an insurer
behaves in this fashion, the plaintiff and the insured will have an incentive
to strike side deals without the insurer's knowledge. Perhaps a more
persuasive defense of the assumption that the insured does not contribute
to settlement is that the transaction costs of doing so can be high. In-
sureds often lack separate counsel and may be ignorant of their exposure
in the event of litigation. Counsel for the insurer may even mislead them
into underestimating their exposure at trial. Plaintiffs will then have diffi-
culty communicating effectively with insureds about the possible merits
of a contribution to settlement and often may not bother to try. Still, the
suspicion remains that efforts by plaintiffs to draw insureds into negotia-
tions will sometimes be successful and that insurers will then have diffi-
culty insisting that the plaintiff settle for the insurer's best offer when the
insured is willing to chip in more if necessary.
22 A further problem is that Meurer's depiction of threat points seemingly fails to take
proper account of the insurer's ability to tender the policy limits and walk away from any
duty to defend. But this deficiency does not go to the heart of any of his conclusions.
23 Meurer, supra note 19, at 510 (see, for example, eq. [7]).
24 In fact, in Crisci itself, the insurer refused to settle at one point despite the expressed
willingness of the insured to contribute a modest amount. Id.
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There is a third objection to Meurer's analysis. His model implies that
the existence of insurance decreases the plaintiffs ultimate recovery un-
der the no duty rule. Yet, even in the days before bad faith litigation,
rarely would we imagine plaintiffs' lawyers lamenting the fact that the
tortfeasor was insured. One reason, omitted from Meurer's analysis, is
that the transaction costs of collecting judgments directly from a tortfea-
sor may greatly exceed the costs of collecting from an insurance company
with a reputational interest in paying legitimate claims promptly to keep
its policyholders happy. A second and more important reason, also omit-
ted from Meurer's analysis, is that tortfeasors often have limited assets
and insurance then increases the potential recovery of the plaintiff.
Indeed, as noted earlier, the fact that insureds have finite assets affords
a standard explanation for the existence of policy limits.25 This observa-
tion suggests a range of additional issues relating to the choice among
the Crisci rule and its alternatives that remain to be explored.
II. POLICY LIMITS AND THE JUDGMENT-PROOF PROBLEM WHEN THE
INSURED DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
This section develops a model of the optimal contract between an in-
surer and an insured with limited assets. As noted, the analysis may be
interpreted both as an inquiry into the appropriate default option for
an incomplete contract and as an inquiry into the question whether an
unambiguous contract that allocates complete discretion over settlement
to the insurer is the product of market failure. I reiterate once again the
lack of generality owing to the exclusion of other explanations for policy
limits.
As the discussion of Meurer's model suggests, the effects of an arrange-
ment that grants discretion over settlement to the insurer may depend
importantly on the extent to which the insured participates with the in-
surer in settlement negotiations. The analysis in this section assumes that
25 Another important reason why risk-averse individuals do not purchase coverage suffi-
cient to protect their assets against any possible judgment is that the price of insurance is
not "actuarially fair"-that is, the expected dollar payout under the policy is less than the
premium. A classic exposition of optimal insurance purchases when the premium exceeds
the actuarially fair price is Kenneth V. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941 (1963) (appendix). See also Karl H. Borch, The
Economics of Insurance 144-50 (1990). It is also sometimes claimed that adverse selection
problems lead to policy limits, with low-risk insureds buying low levels of coverage at an
attractive price and high-risk insureds buying greater coverage at a premium price. See
Syverud, supra note 1, at 1134-35; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521, 1573 (1987). Moral hazard is another explanation,
discussed briefly below. This list is not exhaustive.
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the insured does not participate because of high transaction costs, an
assumption that the next section relaxes.
Some readers will have difficulty following the formal analytics. Unfor-
tunately, because of the need to work with a concave utility function
(risk aversion), transparent numerical examples are rather difficult to con-
struct. Nevertheless, a numerical illustration that conveys many of the
essential points may be found in Section 11D.
To simplify the exposition of the basic results, assume that litigation
costs are zero for both parties. I recognize that this assumption will seem
peculiar in a model that concerns settlement negotiations, but the insights
of the model do not turn on it. Section IV will discuss the implications
of relaxing it and indicate why the key insights survive.
Assume further that insurance is sold at an actuarially fair premium,
which implies that expected liability payments under any policy are equal
to premiums collected. In addition, assume that the insurer knows the
precise risk associated with insuring any policyholder. These assump-
tions rule out two alternative explanations for policy limits that would
otherwise require attention. 26
The insured has a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function in
wealth, u(), strictly increasing and strictly concave (risk aversion). Prior
to any assessment of liability or purchase of insurance coverage, the
insured's wealth is w.
With probability a an accident will occur, and subsequently the injured
party will have an opportunity to obtain a judicial determination as to the
amount of the insured's liability. The accident probability is exogenous,
although the implications of allowing it to depend on the insured's level
of care will be addressed later. The absence of a care decision here, of
course, implies that the insured's activities are subject to a strict liability
rule.
Assume that litigation after the accident will result in the imposition of
one of three levels of liability on the insured, all strictly positive-call
them L I, L 2 , and L3 . The probability of each judgment is correspondingly
1, IP2, and P33, and the expected liability judgment, L, is then Ei P1iLi.
These probabilities are known to all parties.
Think of L1 as "low" liability, L 2 as "modest" liability, and L 3 as
"high" liability. 27 Assume that the insured is always able to pay a "low"
26 See note 25 supra.
27 The reason for analyzing a model with three levels of liability relates to the operation
of the Crisci rule, which under present assumptions places no restrictions on the insurer
unless a settlement offer is received within the policy limits. For such an offer to be made
under the zero litigation costs assumption when the insured has partial coverage, there
must exist at least three levels of liability.
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or "modest" judgment whatever the level of insurance coverage but is
unable to pay a "high" judgment unless insured. Hence, L, < L 2 < w <
L 3 . Assume further, though not essential to the results, that L 3 - L2 >
w. This assumption implies that the insured will still become insolvent in
the event of "high" liability even if insurance coverage equal to L 2 has
been purchased.
After an accident but prior to trial, the parties will have an opportunity
to settle the case. Assume that the plaintiff is risk neutral, let the plain-
tiff's expected return from trial equal SP, and assume that the plaintiff
will never thwart settlement by insisting on more than SP, It is not neces-
sary to specify a bargaining model to determine the division of the gains
from settlement when the insurer is willing to pay more than SP because,
as the analysis will show, the settlement range collapses to a point when
the insured selects coverage optimally.
Under any contractual or judicial default rule, the insured's optimiza-
tion problem involves the selection of a level of coverage, c, given the
anticipated behavior of the insurer in the event of a claim, and given the
actuarially fair premium, Ir(c).
A. The No Duty Rule
Consider first the consequences of an express or implied "no duty"
rule that allows the insurer to accept or reject settlement offers solely
with reference to its own financial interests. Under this rule as under any
other, the plaintiff will insist on receiving at least SP in settlement. But
the insurer operating under a no duty rule expects to lose less than this
amount at trial if the insured has selected a level of coverage below L 3,
the upper bound on liability (remember the zero litigation costs assump-
tion)-the reason is that the insured will contribute something to the
plaintiffs recovery in the event that the judgment equals L 3 . Hence, with
less than full coverage, litigation will occur. Of course, with positive
litigation costs, settlement is still possible with less than full coverage,
but as argued in Section IV this complication does not undermine the
qualitative results that this simpler model suggests.
Using the assumption that the insured can always pay "low" or "mod-
est" judgments, the insured's optimization problem is then to select cov-
erage c to maximize
E{u( )} = (I - ot)u[w - -r(c)] + ctI3 1u{w - -a(c) - L 1 + min[c, L 1]}
+ c432 u{W - T(C) - L 2 + min[c,L2 ]}
+ c433 u(max{O, w - Tr(c) - L 3 + min[c, L 3]})
subject to rr(c) = a{3 1 min(c, LI) + 32 min(c, L2 ) + 33c}.
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This problem is a variant of a slightly simpler problem discussed by
Shavell.28 Because the objective function is not continuously differenti-
able, no single set of first-order conditions is necessary for its solution.
Instead, the usual first-order conditions determine only a "suboptimun"
for each of the three regions where differentiability holds (that is, the
regions c E [0, L]; c E (LI, L 2]; and c E (L 2 , L 3]). The three suboptima
must then be compared to ascertain which is the global optimum.
Because Shavell solved a similar problem elsewhere and because the
algebra is lengthy yet straightforward, I omit the mathematics of the
solution and simply state it: 29 the optimal value of coverage, C, satisfies
C Ez [0, L 2 ) or C = L 3.
Intuitively, an individual who is close to risk neutral may prefer a zero
level of coverage. Even though the premium is actuarially fair from the
insurer's perspective, which ordinarily would lead to the purchase of full
coverage by any risk averter, a portion of the premium benefits not the
insured but the plaintiff. More precisely, if the insured purchases one
dollar of coverage, the insured benefits from that purchase only if liability
is "low" or "modest," and the plaintiff receives the benefits when liabil-
ity is "high." Consequently, from the insured's perspective, the price of
coverage is not actuarially fair. A risk-neutral individual is strictly worse
off buying coverage, therefore, and someone close to risk neutral can be
as well.
At the other end of the continuum, individuals who are quite risk averse
may select full coverage. Even though full coverage increases the ex-
pected award to the plaintiff, perhaps considerably, by eliminating the
judgment-proof problem, it also provides the insured with a level of
wealth that is constant across all contingencies and is thus appealing to
risk averters.3 ° Insureds are also more likely to select full coverage if the
"high" liability outcome involves a judgment only modestly in excess of
their assets or if its probability, 33, is very small, for then the "subsidy"
to the plaintiff under full coverage is less.
Intermediate levels of coverage are also possible. Moderately risk-
averse individuals may find that it pays to buy some protection against
"low" and "modest" losses yet does not pay to insure against the highest
28 See Shavell, supra note 18; Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law
257-58 (1987). In fact, Shavell notes the solution to this problem as well though he does
not supply the algebra.
29 The author will supply the formal derivation on request.
30 It is perhaps instructive to consider a utility function that reflects the most extreme
risk aversion possible: u( ) = mini[wil, where i is an index of states of nature. An individual
with this utility function cares only about the worst-case scenario and will surely prefer full
coverage.
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possible loss given the fact that part of the premium goes to benefit the
plaintiff. Again, the greater is the excess of "high" liability over the in-
sured's assets, and the greater is the probability of "high" liability, the
more likely that an insured who opts for some coverage will select only
partial coverage.
The solution excludes levels of coverage greater than or equal to L 2
but less than L 3 . The intuition here is that at coverage levels above L 2 , the
marginal premium dollar funds greater levels of coverage for the "high"
liability outcome only. Up to the point at which the insured is able to
pay the entire "high" judgment through a combination of insurance cov-
erage and other assets, all of the additional coverage benefits the plaintiff.
Clearly, therefore, the marginal returns to additional coverage over this
range are negative. And, once the level of coverage rises to the point
that the insured has some assets left after paying the "high" judgment,
additional insurance becomes actuarially fair from the insured's perspec-
tive, and it pays to go all the way to full coverage. It can also be shown
readily that at coverage exactly equal to L 2 , the marginal utility of cover-
age is negative for reasons relating to the fact that insurance at that level
is actuarially unfair from the insured's perspective.
B. The Crisci Rule
We now inquire whether an express or implied Crisci rule will benefit
the insured relative to the no duty rule (the insurer by assumption earns
zero profits under all circumstances and is thus indifferent among legal/
contractual regimes). For purposes of the model, the Crisci rule is as-
sumed to function costlessly and without error, and thus the results here
surely afford a generous assessment of its effects.
Recall that the most general statement of the Crisci rule holds the
insurer liable for failure to settle whenever the settlement offer is below
the expected liability judgment plus the costs of litigation. In fact, the
operation of the rule is somewhat more complicated because that condi-
tion may hold, yet the settlement offer may exceed the policy limits and
thus exceed what the insurer is obligated to pay. Some commentators
suggest that the Crisci rule applies only when the insurer has received
an offer within the policy limits,3 while others suggest that liability should
also attach if the insured was willing to contribute the difference between
the policy limits and a settlement offer in excess of them. 32 In this section,
however, we have assumed that the insured does not offer to contribute
31 See Abraham, supra note 11, at 191-92.
32 See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 5, at 890-91.
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to settlement because of high transaction costs. Thus, the Crisci rule has
bite in the model only when the plaintiff is willing to settle for an amount
within the policy limits. Formally, using the zero litigation costs assump-
tion, the Crisci rule imposes liability when the plaintiff's best settlement
offer, S, satisfies S - c and S - L.
Further, drawing on the assumption that the plaintiff never thwarts
settlement by insisting on more than the returns to trial, it follows that
the plaintiff is always willing to settle for an amount S -< L because L is
the upper bound on the returns to trial. Consequently, anytime the parties
fail to settle and the plaintiff has made an offer within the policy limits,
liability will attach in this model under the Crisci rule. By contrast, when
the failure to settle is because the plaintiff does not make an offer within
the policy limits, the insurer faces no exposure under Crisci.
This proposition suggests that a critical level of coverage will exist,
below which the Crisci rule is of no consequence because the plaintiff
will not settle within the policy limits. Above that critical level, however,
the plaintiff is willing to settle within the policy limits, and the insurer
faces expected costs at trial equal to L if the settlement offer is rejected.
Hence, the insurer will settle because the prospective trial outcome is no
better and perhaps worse.
More precisely, imagine that the insured has purchased coverage so
that the plaintiff's returns to trial-and thus best offer in settlement nego-
tiations-are exactly equal to the level of coverage. When the plaintiff
makes a settlement offer equal to this level of coverage, the insurer will
accept it under the Crisci rule. Hence, for this level of coverage, call it
fl, the actuarially fair premium is equal to cxfl.
Plainly, this critical level of coverage exceeds L,, the "low" level of
liability, because when the insured purchases C = L1, the plaintiff's
returns to trial are 3,L, + [32L 2 + 133 [w - IT(LI) + L 1], an amount that
surely exceeds L1. The critical level of coverage may or may not be
below L2, a fact that becomes significant in a moment.
Depending on parameter values, it turns out that there may or may not
exist fl such that 0 < L. Recalling that the plaintiff's recovery in the
event of a judgment equal to L 3 will be min[w - Tn(c) + c, L 3], the
question whether there exists il < L is equivalent to the question whether
there exists a level of coverage, call it c*, such that c* < L and c* satisfies
C* = P3ILI + P 2 L 2 + 3[w - ocC* + c*]. (1)
This equation can be solved for c* readily. If the resulting value of c* <
L, some algebra shows that w + (1 - ct)L < L 3 must hold. For a combi-
nation of parameter values that satisfies this inequality, therefore, there
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exists a level of coverage below L at which the plaintiff will settle for
exactly the policy limit. And, for any combination of parameter values,
fl = min(c*, L).
We can also show readily that when fl = c*, a settlement offer will
be forthcoming within the policy limits for any higher value of coverage.
This is obvious for coverage of L or greater, because the plaintiff's re-
turns to trial are never more than L. For c* < c < L as well, the plaintiff
will not insist on more than c. To see why, refer to equation (1), and
note that as c increases above c*, the left-hand side rises faster than the
right-hand side. But the right-hand side is simply the plaintiff's returns
to trial, which are thus less than the policy limit.
We can now establish two propositions:
PROPOSITION 1. When f = L, the Crisci rule is of absolutely no sig-
nificance to the insured.
Proof. The proof has two parts. First, we show that if L -< L 2, then
fl = c*. Hence, we rule out the possibility that the critical level of cover-
age is L in this situation. To do so, recall that we have already shown
that c* > L-thus, substituting L1 for c* in equation (1), the right-hand
side will exceed the left-hand side. At c = L - L 2 , the returns to trial
for the plaintiff are less than L, using the assumption that at coverage
levels below L 2 the insured still becomes insolvent in the event of "high"
liability. Thus, substituting L for c* in equation (1), the left-hand side
exceeds the right-hand side. And, because the derivative of the left-hand
side of the equation with respect to c is unity, while the derivative of the
right-hand side is less than unity, it follows that there exists c* such that
L1 < c* < L and equation (1) holds. Hence, fl = L implies that L > L 2 .
For the second part of the proof, recall that under the no duty rule,
the optimal value of coverage is either less than L 2 or equal to L. Hence,
for any value of coverage that is optimal under the no duty rule other
than L, no settlement offer will be forthcoming within the policy limit at
that level of coverage under the Crisci rule. Therefore, the same policy
will be available to the insured under the Crisci rule (that is, the insured
can purchase the same coverage for the same premium). And, because
the premium for a policy with coverage of fl or greater under the Crisci
rule is ctL and the insured is fully protected against liability, it follows
that the insured is indifferent between such a policy and full coverage
under the no duty rule. In short, any optimal policy under the no duty
rule can be replicated under the Crisci rule, and the Crisci rule does not
make possible any policy that could dominate the policy that is optimal
under the no duty rule. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 2. When ft = c*, the insured can only benefit from the
Crisci rule.
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Proof. For levels of coverage below c*, as noted, the Crisci rule is
of no consequence because the plaintiff is not willing to settle within the
policy limits. The case will be litigated as before. Hence, with the Crisci
rule in place, the insured can still choose any level of coverage c < c*,
pay the same premium as under the no duty rule, and have the same
expected utility. What remains is to show how the Crisci rule can benefit
the insured.
Observe that no rational insured would purchase more than c* in cover-
age under the Crisci rule.33 For any choice of c - c*, settlement invari-
ably occurs because an offer is received within the policy limits. The
insured is no longer exposed to any liability in litigation, and thus the
insured's utility level is now certain, given by the expression u{w -
c[min(c, L)]}. This expression is strictly decreasing in c over the range
c* - c - L. Thus, c* is the insured's best choice in this range. Proposition
2 will now be established by showing that expected utility is higher with
coverage of c* under the Crisci rule than at any level of coverage equal
to c* or higher under the no duty rule.
As we recall the set of conceivable optima under the no duty rule,
there are two possibilities. The first is that the insured buys full coverage
under the no duty rule. Expected utility is plainly greater with coverage
c* under the Crisci rule because the insured faces no liability exposure
in either case, but the premium under the Crisci rule is less than it is
under the no duty rule: ac* < aL.
The second possibility is that the optimum under the no duty rule lies
in the region c* < c < L 2 -. Consider first the special case where c = c*
under the no duty rule. Observe that the insurer expects to pay at trial
the amount -rr(c*) = a[131Ll + (P32 + 133)c*] while the expected liability
of the insured in excess of the policy limit is a132(L2 - c*) + c433{w -
,r(c*)}. Because the premium is actuarially fair, the expected wealth of
the insured is then equal to w less the sum of these two amounts, call it
F, given by F = a{131Ll + 132L 2 + 33[W - Tr(c*) + c*]}. Under the
Crisci rule, the insured faces no expected liability from trial because
settlement will occur at c*. The insured's expected wealth is thus equal
to w less the actuarially fair insurance premium for coverage c*, equal
to ac*. By equation (1), ac* < F, and thus the insured's expected wealth
is higher at coverage level c* under the Crisci rule than under the no
duty rule. Further, the insured enjoys his expected wealth with certainty
under the Crisci rule but not under the no duty rule. By Jensen's inequal-
33 Note that because of this result, the settlement range when the plaintiff makes an offer
within the policy limits collapses to a point as suggested earlier, and the division of surplus
between the insurer and the plaintiff need not be addressed.
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ity, which holds that for any random variable 0, Eu(0) < u(EO) for any
concave function u(), the insured is surely better off under the Crisci
rule. 34 Finally, consider the more likely case where c* < c < L 2 under
the no duty rule. The sum of the amounts that the insurer and insured
expect to pay at trial is now given by ot{$1 L1 + 132L2 + 133[w - 'rr(c) +
c]}. This amount assuredly exceeds F by the fact that a[w - r(c) + c]/
Oc > 0. Therefore, the insured's expected wealth must be even lower at
such a coverage level under the no duty rule than it is for coverage level
c*. Again, it follows that the insured is better off at coverage level c*
under the Crisci rule. Q.E.D.
These results imply that when full coverage is optimal under the no
duty rule, the insured will reduce coverage to c* under the Crisci rule.
The insured then enjoys greater expected utility under the Crisci rule
because the actuarially fair premium for coverage c* under the Crisci
rule, cxc*, is less than the actuarially fair premium for full coverage under
the no duty rule, oLL. The insured also enjoys greater expected utility
under the Crisci rule if coverage under the no duty rule would be partial
but would equal or exceed c*. Finally, if optimal coverage under the no
duty rule is less than c*, then the Crisci rule either makes no difference
(because the same coverage level for the same premium and with the
same expected utility is also available under the Crisci rule) or benefits
the insured by allowing the insured to purchase coverage at c* for the
premium uc*.
C. The Strict Liability Rule
In the model, a strict liability rule functions identically to the'Crisci
rule. When the insured selects a level of coverage so low that no settle-
ment is possible within the policy limits, neither the Crisci rule nor the
strict liability rule exposes the insurer to any prospect of liability. When
the insured selects coverage in excess of the plaintiff's minimum demand
in settlement, the rejection of the plaintiff's best offer results in liability
on the insurer under both rules. Liability follows immediately under the
strict liability rule and also follows under an error-free Crisci rule because
the plaintiff's best offer never exceeds L, the expected judgment at trial.
Hence, the structure of insurance premiums and the utility possibilities
for the insured are identical under the strict liability and Crisci rules. In
the model, both dominate the no duty rule equally from the insured's
perspective. And both produce settlement any time an offer is received
34 See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph F. Stiglitz, Increasing Risk I: A Definition,
2 J. Econ. Theory 225 (1970).
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within the policy limits by the insurer, so that the actual level of litigation
between insurers and insureds in the model is nil under either rule.
It is instructive to contrast the conclusions here with those of Meurer.
In Meurer's model, the insured benefits from the no duty rule because it
enables the selfish insurer to bargain for a better settlement than can be
reached under the Crisci rule (or strict liability), an advantage that the
insured reaps in the form of lower premiums. In this model, both the
Crisci rule and the strict liability rule encourage settlements by the self-
interested insurer when coverage is partial. The insured can benefit be-
cause settlements eliminate risk for the insured and because they occur
at less than the expected value of the judgment at trial due to the insured's
limited assets. Accordingly, the premium for coverage is below the ex-
pected liability judgment even though the insured is protected against
risk by the fact that the insurer will settle within the policy limits. Under
the no duty rule, by contrast, the insured can eliminate the risk of judg-
ments over the policy limit only by purchasing full coverage at a premium
that in turn will reflect the expected value of the judgment.
D. A Numerical Example
To keep the illustration as simple as possible, I will not assume a
particular utility function for the insured but will simply show how the
choices available to the insured change as the legal rule changes. Assume
that a = 1/10 and that the 13i are all equal to 1/3. Let the insured's wealth
equal $100,000, and let L, = $3,000, L2 = $30,000, and L 3 = $300,000.
The expected judgment at trial, L, is thus equal to $111,000.
One option available to the prospective insured is to forgo coverage
altogether and thus bear an expected loss of $4,433 (1/10 times the plain-
tiff's expected collection from the insured at trial). Under the no duty
rule, another option would be to select full coverage of $300,000 for an
actuarially fair premium of $11,100 (I110L). Partial coverage levels are
also a possibility, though the analysis above rules out coverage of $30,000
or more. Without knowing the insured's utility function, we cannot ascer-
tain precisely what coverage level will be selected.
Under the Crisci or strict liability rules, some algebra verifies that fl
= c*. The lowest level of coverage at which settlement will occur is then
given by equation (1), which can be solved readily to yield c* = $63,333
(approximately). By purchasing this amount of coverage, the insured will
have enough that the plaintiff's settlement offer falls within the policy
limit, and the insurer will accept it. The actuarially fair premium for this
level of coverage is $6,333. By purchasing coverage in this amount, the
risk-averse insured can eliminate all risk (settlement occurs and hence
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there is no exposure to an excess judgment at trial) and can do so for
only about 57% of the cost of eliminating all risk under the no duty rule
(the purchase of full coverage).
Without knowing the insured's utility function, we cannot know what
options the insured would select under either rule. It is certainly plausible
that some insureds under the no duty rule might forgo coverage, or select
only partial coverage, yet would find the opportunity to eliminate all risk
for $6,333 quite attractive under the Crisci or strict liability rule. In that
event, either of those rules would have induced the insureds to absorb a
greater proportion of the expected loss associated with their activities. It
is also plausible that some insureds would select full coverage under the
no duty rule. They would then reduce their coverage to $63,333 under
the Crisci or strict liability rules, and thus a shift to either rule would
have induced the insureds to externalize some of the expected losses
associated with their activities.
III. POLICY LIMITS AND THE JUDGMENT-PROOF PROBLEM WHEN THE
INSURED DOES PARTICIPATE IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
It remains to consider a number of practical complications relating to
some strong assumptions in the model and to consider the relation be-
tween the insured's welfare and social welfare. But prior to a discussion
of these issues, it is useful to relax the formal assumption that the insured
never offers to contribute to settlement.
The key proposition above, that the Crisci rule or a strict liability rule
allows the insured to eliminate risk while still externalizing some portion
of the expected judgment, remains valid when the insured participates
in settlement negotiations and contributes to settlement. The primary
difference here is that if the insured can contribute to settlement, litiga-
tion will never occur when the plaintiff, defendant, and insurer have
common beliefs about the outcome of litigation. Risk can still exist for
the insured, however, because in the event of an accident a contribution
to settlement may be required.
Another difference arises because the settlement range need no longer
collapse to a point. The division of gains from settlement then becomes
an issue.
A. The No Duty Rule
Retaining the familiar notation, the plaintiff's expected returns at trial
(given that an accident has occurred) are still Sp = PIL 1 + 0 2 L 2 + P3
min[w - iT(c) + c, L 3]. Define the insurer's expected losses at trial as
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Sr = 3, min(c, L 1) + 32 min(c, L 2 ) + 33 c. Plainly, Sr < Sp for coverage
less than L 3, and thus the plaintiff's minimum settlement demand exceeds
what the insurer is willing to pay.
Assume that the transaction costs of participation in the settlement
negotiation are zero for the insured. Because the insured is risk averse,
the amount that the insured will contribute to settlement surely exceeds
the expected value of the insured's losses at trial (Jensen's inequality
again). Since the latter amount is simply SP - S, it follows that the
insured is always willing to contribute more than the difference between
the plaintiff's expected returns at trial and the insurer's expected losses
to avoid litigation. Settlement should always occur, and a range of settle-
ment outcomes is possible.
The terms of settlement will depend on the bargaining process. It is
possible that the insurer will be able to reduce its contribution to settle-
ment below its expected loss at trial35 and that the plaintiff may be able to
hold out for more than the expected returns to trial. To avoid specifying a
process to determine the precise terms of settlement, I simply assume in
this section that the best-case outcome for the insured will prevail. This
is no doubt unrealistic but is at least arguably harmless for purposes of
the present exercise because the objective is to compare the effects of
alternative rules on welfare. As long as the assumption about the in-
sured's bargaining strength is maintained throughout the comparison, the
conclusions about the relative merits of the alternative rules should not
be distorted.
In the best-case scenario for the insured, the insured's contribution to
settlement under the no duty rule, call it S i, is simply the difference SP
- S, = 3, min[L, - min(c, L,)] + [32 [L2 - min(c, L 2)] + 33 min[w -
n(c), L 3 - c]. The insured's expected utility can then be written
E{u( )} = (1 - ct)u[w - w(c)] + oxu[w - 'n(c) - Si],
where rr(c) = aS.
The insured will choose coverage to maximize this expression.
Again the algebra is lengthy yet straightforward, and I will simply state
the solution, which is almost identical to the solution when the insured
does not contribute to settlement. Optimal coverage C satisfies C E [0,
L 2] or C = L 3 . The intuition regarding the solution possibilities is much
as before.
35 Competitive pressures would then drive the actuarially fair premium lower, but the
prospect that premiums will fall in the aggregate is not enough to discourage individual
insurers from obtaining the best deal possible in each case. Reputational concerns are a
more likely source of restraint on aggressive bargaining by the insurer at the expense of
the insured, but one cannot be certain that they would suffice to discourage it altogether.
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The insured is better off under the no duty rule when a contribution to
settlement is possible because the insured enjoys the same expected
wealth as before when no contribution to settlement is possible, yet there
is no variance in wealth associated with the three possible trial outcomes.
By Jensen's inequality, the insured's expected utility is thus greater. The
caveat relates to the bargaining assumption made above-if all the gains
to settlement were extracted from the insured, then the insured would
be indifferent between trial and settlement and expected utility would be
the same as before. As long as the insured retains some of the gains
from settlement, however, the opportunity to contribute to settlement is
valuable.
B. The Crisci Rule
As noted, the Crisci rule clearly holds liable an insurer who rejects a
settlement offer within the policy limits if the expected joint costs of trial
exceed the settlement offer. Some controversy exists, however, whether
liability will attach when the settlement offer exceeds the policy limits but
the insured would have been willing to make up the difference.36 Thus,
we might consider two alternatives: "Version 1" of the Crisci rule, which
applies only when an offer is received by the insurer within the policy
limits, and "Version 2," which applies when the amount that the insured
is willing to contribute to settlement, when combined with the policy
limit, exceeds the settlement demand. Because the analysis of Version 2
is complicated but does not change the key results in any fundamental
way, and because it may not reflect the law in many jurisdictions, I
relegate a short discussion of it to an Appendix.
The analysis of "Version 1" is strikingly similar to the analysis when
the insured does not contribute to settlement. Once again, a critical level
of coverage exists, below which the insurer will not receive an offer
within the policy limits. On the assumption that the insurer is always
willing to contribute its expected losses at trial toward settlement (and
does not try to extract any of the insured's risk premium), this critical
level of coverage will be identical to its level when the insured does not
contribute to settlement. That is, depending on the parameters of the
problem, it will equal c* or L as defined in Section II.
For coverage below the critical level, the insured will confront the
same premiums and expected utility as under the no duty rule and will
make the same contribution to settlement. At or above the critical level
of coverage, however, the insurer becomes liable for the entire expected
36 See sources cited notes 31-32 supra.
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judgment at trial if it rejects the plaintiff's offer. The insured knows this
fact and thus is no longer willing to make a contribution to settlement to
avoid litigation. As a consequence, the insurer will accept the plaintiff's
settlement offer and pay the entire amount itself. Coverage adjusts opti-
mally, and again it is never in the insured's interest to buy more coverage
than the critical amount at which the plaintiff's expected returns to trial-
quite possibly below the expected judgment because of the judgment-
proof problem-are exactly equal to the coverage level. By purchasing
the critical level of coverage and no more, the insured eliminates all risk
(settlement occurs and the insured need not contribute) for an actuarially
fair premium that in many instances will be less than the expected judg-
ment at trial. And, by logic identical to that in Section I, it follows that
the Crisci rule can only benefit the insured.
C. The Strict Liability Rule
"Version I" of a strict liability rule would hold the insurer liable for
the full judgment if an offer is rejected within the policy limits, while
"Version 2" would hold the insurer liable for rejecting an offer when the
sum of the policy limits and the amount that the insured will contribute
to settlement exceeds the settlement demand. Either way, the behavior
of the insurer will be the same as under the parallel version of the Crisci
rule, since anytime litigation occurs the insurer must have rejected an
offer under conditions that would violate the Crisci rule. The parallel to
the environment in which the insured does not participate in settlement
negotiations is now complete.
IV. IMPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND COMPLICATIONS
It is important to distinguish between the effects of alternative rules
on the parties and their effects on society as a whole. This concluding
section also considers the possible consequences of relaxing some of the
assumptions employed in the model.
A. Summary of the Welfare Effects in the Model
Under the stringent simplifying assumptions of the model, the analysis
here lends some support to the courts' argument that a duty to settle on
the insurer is important to the insured. Absent such a duty, the insurer
may elect to litigate when the joint interests of the parties require settle-
ment. The ability of the insured to contribute to settlement ameliorates
this problem but does not eliminate it because the transaction costs of
participating in settlement negotiations may be great for many insureds,
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and for those who can participate cheaply the possible need to do so
creates a risk that many of them would prefer to avoid. Of course, if
enough insureds recognized these difficulties with the no duty rule at the
time of contracting, market incentives to improve on the no duty rule
would exist. Yet, it is possible that transaction costs prevent insureds
from appreciating all the terms of the bargain adequately ex ante and that
reputational constraints on insurers are insufficient to dissuade opportun-
ism ex post.
Perhaps the most interesting result to emerge from the model is that
the gains to the insured from the insurer's duty to settle can be in the
nature of allowing the insured to "have his cake and eat it too." Ideally,
risk-averse insureds prefer to lay off all financial risk on insurers. When
the prospective insured has assets insufficient to pay large judgments,
however, the price of doing so often makes full insurance coverage unat-
tractive because the total assets at risk are considerably increased. The
insured under the no duty rule then confronts a trade-off between bearing
suboptimal risk while externalizing liability or laying off the risk while
forfeiting the opportunity to externalize liability. Again, this problem di-
minishes but is not eliminated if the insured participates in settlement
negotiations. Either the Crisci rule or a strict liability rule, by contrast,
leads to settlement by the insurer, with the insurer bearing the entire cost
of settlement, as long as coverage exceeds a critical level. Quite plausibly
in many cases, this critical level of coverage will be considerably below
the actuarially expected judgment at trial. It is given in general by the
level of coverage at which the plaintiff's returns to trial are exactly equal
to the policy limit. By purchasing this critical level of coverage, the in-
sured is able to eliminate risk (and a fortiori to eliminate any danger of
insolvency) while for many parameter values retaining the capacity to
externalize liability.
B. Complications and Extensions of the Model
The simplifying assumptions in the model are numerous and warrant
further attention.
Litigation Costs. Litigation costs are central to the literature on suit
and settlement. Their existence in many models provides the gains from
settlement, and their omission from the model above requires further
comment.
Because both the plaintiff and the defendant/insurer in reality incur
incremental litigation costs if they go to trial, the result in the model that
the insurer will litigate under the no duty rule anytime the insured has
purchased less than full coverage is plainly too strong. The insured with
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only partial coverage would still find in many cases that the insurer settles
with the plaintiff, even without a contribution from the defendant, to
avoid the defense costs that it would otherwise incur. The fact that the
insurer bears defense costs, therefore, may do much to ameliorate the
problem that the Crisci rule was designed to address. But the fact that
the insurer bears defense costs is not enough to eliminate potential con-
flicts of interest between the insurer and the insured. In this respect, the
addition of litigation costs to the model would not change the essence of
the problem.
One might suspect that a model with litigation costs would have a larger
settlement range, and the familiar indeterminacy about the outcome of
bargaining would then become more prominent. If so, the issue addressed
by Meurer would resurface, as might his result that policy limits may
strengthen the bargaining position of the insured in some cases when the
insured cannot be drawn into settlement negotiations. It is noteworthy,
however, that Meurer's result can vanish when the insured is potentially
judgment proof. The purchase of insurance coverage increases the plain-
tiff's expected recovery at trial, which offsets at least in part any bar-
gaining advantage created by delegating settlement authority to the in-
surer. Indeed, the savvy insured can once again exploit the judg-
ment-proof problem by reducing coverage to the degree that the range of
settlement outcomes collapses to a point and forces the plaintiff down to
exactly the returns to trial. Compounding the problem from the plaintiff's
perspective is that the consequence of litigation costs on the plaintiff's
side under the American rule is to reduce the plaintiff's best settlement
offer. This effect simply enhances the ability of the insured to externalize
liability and lowers the critical level of coverage at which the case settles
within the policy limits.
To illustrate these points very briefly, return to the numerical example
that concluded Section II and assume as did Section II that transaction
costs preclude any contribution by the insured to settlement. All assump-
tions about parameter values in the model remain the same, except as-
sume now that the insurer and the plaintiff will each incur incremental
litigation costs of $10,000 if they go to trial.
Begin with the no duty rule. Previously, with zero litigation costs, the
insured could avoid litigation only by purchasing full coverage of
$300,000, for the premium of $11,100. Here, by contrast, the existence
of litigation costs on the plaintiff's side will allow a lower level of cover-
age to suffice. In particular, observe that at a coverage level of $240,000,
the insurer's expected cost of going to trial is 1/3 * $3,000 + 1/3 * $30,000
+ 1/3 * $240,000 + $10,000 = $101,000. When the insured has coverage
of $240,000, the entire judgment is paid even if liability is $300,000 (re-
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member, the insured has $100,000 in assets). Thus, the plaintiff's ex-
pected gains from trial are $111,000 less the $10,000 litigation cost, or
$101,000. Hence, the plaintiff's best settlement offer at this level of cov-
erage exactly equals the insurer's best offer. And, on the assumption that
the insured cannot be dragged in and held up for a contribution, settle-
ment will occur at that figure. The actuarially fair premium will be
$10,100. Without knowing the insured's utility function, there can be no
assurance that the insured will purchase this level of coverage, but it is
apparent that even under the no duty rule, the insured may be able to
eliminate all risk while still externalizing some portion of expected losses.
This analysis seems reminiscent of Meurer's but is actually quite differ-
ent-the no duty rule is not the source of a bargaining advantage, but
rather the insured here exploits the ability to select coverage so that the
plaintiff can extract none of the gains from settlement.
Now consider the Crisci rule. The expression for c* in equation (1)
supplies the point of departure, as it will again be true that 11 = c*. The
right-hand side of equation (1), substituting c for c*, provides the plain-
tiff's expected returns to trial for coverage values at which the insured
is insolvent except that the plaintiff's litigation costs must now be de-
ducted. So modified, it again represents the plaintiff's best settlement
offer at each coverage level. When this best offer is below the policy
limit and the insurer rejects it, the Crisci rule will impose liability on the
insurer for the entire judgment (joint expected losses at trial for the in-
surer and the insured have only increased with the addition of litigation
costs). The insurer will accept a settlement offer at or below the policy
limits, therefore, in preference to this outcome. Hence, the critical value
of coverage is now found in accordance with a modified equation (I), the
one change being that plaintiff's litigation costs are deducted from the
right-hand side. Inserting the assumed parameter values and solving
yields a value of coverage equal to $49,047 (approximately). When the
insured purchases this level of coverage, the plaintiff will once again be
willing to make a settlement offer exactly equal to the policy limits, and
settlement will occur. The actuarially fair premium for this level of cover-
age is $4,905.
A comparison of the two examples, with and without litigation costs,
suggests that the insured potentially benefits from the presence of litiga-
tion costs on the plaintiff's side whatever the legal rule in force, because
such costs lower the plaintiff's settlement price. This is perhaps an inter-
esting point on its own, because in models without limited assets the
introduction of litigation costs also raises the defendant's best settlement
offer, so that there is no reason to think that defendants systematically
benefit.
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More important for present purposes, the potential gain to the insured
from the Crisci (or strict liability) rule is readily apparent. By the same
logic as before, the Crisci rule enables the insured to avoid all risk for
a premium considerably below the expected losses associated with the
insured's activities. Indeed, recall that the uninsured defendant's ex-
pected payment to the plaintiff ex ante is $4,433, and if the uninsured
defendant bore $10,000 litigation costs at trial as well, the expected cost
of trial ex ante to an uninsured defendant would be $5,433. Here, for a
payment actually below that figure and only modestly above the expected
payment to the plaintiff without insurance, the prospective defendant can
purchase insurance that guarantees a settlement and that avoids all risk.
It seems likely that many insureds will take advantage of this opportunity
and equally plausible that in so doing they will be purchasing a level of
coverage below what they would purchase under the no duty rule.
In short, the addition of litigation costs to the model would complicate
the analysis but seemingly not change it in any fundamental respect. The
conflict of interest that the Crisci rule was designed to confront remains,
as do the most prominent consequences of adopting the Crisci rule.
Disparate Expectations about Litigation and the Choice between the
Crisci and Strict Liability Rules. When the probability distribution of
outcomes in litigation is common knowledge and all parties are repre-
sented by faithful agents, settlement should always occur. The very exis-
tence of litigation suggests the presence of opportunism or strategic be-
havior by at least one of the parties or their agent or that at least one of
the parties has erred in assessing the likely outcome at trial. The latter
possibility, and the fact that the probability distribution of outcomes at
trial is neither observable-by a court nor common knowledge to the par-
ties, introduces a range of complications.
Perhaps most obvious, it supplies one reason why a difference will
arise in practice between the Crisci rule and a strict liability rule, contrary
to the model's suggestion that the two are equivalent. In fact, a familiar
argument against a strict liability rule is that it would require insurers to
pay the full judgment even when they correctly reject settlement offers
as excessive.37 This argument might be rephrased as follows: Sometimes
plaintiffs are overoptimistic about their chances and insist on an amount
in settlement that exceeds their properly calculated expected returns to
trial. It is in the mutual interest of the insurer and the insured for such
offers to be rejected and for litigation to go forward (ignoring the insured's
risk aversion). The insurer who proceeds to litigate under the Crisci rule
is protected from liability to the insured, but the insurer subject to a strict
37 For example, Abraham, supra note 11, at 194-95.
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liability rule is not, a fact that is thought to constitute an important reason
why the strict liability rule may be undesirable. It is even suggested that
a strict liability rule might be tantamount to the abolition of policy limits.
38
This argument is not altogether without merit, but the problems that
would arise under a strict liability rule are also easily exaggerated. The
failure of the parties to settle when the plaintiff is more optimistic can
reflect either an error by the plaintiff or an error by the defendant. The
Crisci rule attempts to sort cases in this manner ex post, but its ability
to do so successfully may be doubted. In fact, the actual outcome of
litigation may often provide the best evidence as to who made the mistake
ex ante, in which case the two rules may tend to collapse to a degree.
And, to the extent that they do not, adherence to the Crisci rule with its
more unpredictable results simply creates yet another opportunity for the
formation of disparate expectations that lead to inefficient litigation, this
time between the insurer and the insured.
The suggestion that a strict liability regime would do great violence to
the parties' ability to set policy limits may also be questioned (assuming
arguendo that the policy limits are not socially objectionable). Whatever
the rule governing the insurer's liability to the insured for an excess
judgment, it only applies to the modest proportion of cases in which the
plaintiff and the defendant/insurer do not settle and in which this decision
proves unfortunate for the insured in the end. The efficacy of the policy
limit in cases that do settle, or in which the insurer properly litigates
against a plaintiff who ultimately loses or ultimately wins little, will sur-
vive. If one further imagines that cases in which the insurer litigates and
the judgment substantially exceeds the policy limits are frequently due
to errors ex ante by the insurer, and that liability ex post will reduce the
incidence of such errors, then the strict liability regime has some genuine
appeal.
A possible counterargument to the claim that strict liability may domi-
nate the Crisci rule is that a strict liability rule is straightforward to write
down and thus could be included in insurance contracts quite easily.
Even if insurers behaved opportunistically prior to Crisci and similar
decisions, the argument might run, they have no reason to eschew the
contractual solution of strict liability if it would dominate the existing
judicial default option. The difficulty with this argument, of course, is its
presumption that enough insureds will appreciate the virtues of a strict
liability rule and be willing to pay for it so that the insurers have an
incentive to adopt it. If not, the insurer will prefer to retain the Crisci
formulation even if it would not be jointly optimal.
38 Id.
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Endogenous Accident Probability. The model ignores the fact that
the insured in many instances will have the capacity to influence the
probability of the accident through an investment in precautions. From
the parties' perspective, this possibility creates a moral hazard. Its sig-
nificance to them will depend on the importance of precautions to the
reduction of expected liability, on the cost of precautions, and on the
ability of the insurer to induce jointly optimal precautions through en-
forceable contractual provisions that require them.39 It will also depend
on the extent to which the insured and the insurer together externalize
liability .4
Without going into great detail, the introduction of a care decision
by the insured seems unlikely to change any of the central conclusions
developed above about the Crisci rule and its alternatives when the par-
ties can police the moral hazard problem adequately by specifying pre-
cautions in the contract-that is, when the insurer can observe or ascer-
tain the insured's care level at acceptable cost. The insurer can then
induce the insured to invest in jointly optimal precautions by conditioning
coverage on a proper care level or otherwise threatening to penalize the
insured for failure to take proper care. Given ajointly optimal care invest-
ment by the insured, the problem has the same structure as before except
that the care level and the accident probability will become endogenous
to the coverage level. The Crisci rule or strict liability rule will still have
the same potential advantages for the insured, however, by allowing the
insured to eliminate risk in the event of an accident while still externaliz-
ing a portion of liability.
If the moral hazard problem must be addressed by placing added risk
on the insured,4' the analysis becomes more complicated. Consider, for
example, the model in which the insured does not contribute to settle-
ment, and let c * equal the critical level of coverage at which the plaintiff's
returns to trial are equal to the policy limit. Earlier analysis establishes
that the insurer will settle for c* under the Crisci or strict liability rules
and hence that the insured bears no risk when coverage level c* has been
39 See generally Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541
(1979).
o See Shavell, supra note 18, for a discussion of insurance purchase decisions by poten-
tially judgment-proof insureds who have the capacity to influence accident probabilities and
the relation between social and private welfare in such arrangements.
41 When the behavior subject to moral hazard cannot be regulated adequately by contrac-
tual provisions that require the jointly optimal behavior or close to it, it is well known in
both the insurance and agency literatures that the optimal contract must compromise risk
sharing with incentive maintenance, placing greater risk on the risk-averse actor than would
otherwise be desirable.
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purchased. But if the insurer cannot police the insured's care level by
contract and the insured incurs no liability in the event of an accident,
then the incentive to take care vanishes. Premiums for coverage equal to
c* may thus be quite high, which in turn can induce the insured to pur-
chase lower coverage or no coverage. But once the level of coverage
falls below c*, the plaintiff is no longer willing to settle within the policy
limits, and the choice among the Crisci rule and its alternatives will be
of no consequence. This analysis suggests that when moral hazard is
substantial and difficult for the insurer to control, the imposition of a
duty to settle on the insurer may not make much difference if the duty
applies only when a settlement offer is forthcoming within the policy
limits. One caveat is that if the moral hazard problem is addressed
through a sizable deductible, the Crisci rule or a strict liability rule may
function much as before, inducing the insurer to settle when coverage
exceeds a critical level, with the insured contributing the deductible as a
matter of course.
Yet another set of complications associated with the introduction of a
care decision relates to cases in which the insured's liability is only for
negligence. In a perfectly functioning negligence regime, insurance for
negligence liability might never be purchased-if injurers obey the due
care standard there is nothing to insure against, and if they do not because
of the judgment-proof problem, insurance may nevertheless be uneco-
nomical because it results in greater internalization of liability.4" Yet, we
know that in practice insurance for negligence liability is common, and
indeed most of us carry it. The reason no doubt relates to uncertainty
over the due care standard, the possibility of errors in the administration
of the due care standard, the possibility of inadvertent negligence, and
so on.
Without addressing the matter formally, such departures from an ideal-
ized conception of negligence seem likely to generate the equivalent of a
strict liability regime with a care decision in many respects. When an
accident occurs for any care level, some distribution of liability will re-
main. The results in the model, appropriately modified in accordance
with the nature of the moral hazard problem, may thus have much to say
about a negligence regime as well.
Heterogeneity of Covered Accidents and More States of Nature. The
model assumes that only one "accident" can occur, with three possible
42 This idea is developed in Shavell, supra note 18. The proposition that insurance is not
cost effective for a judgment-proof insured who will exercise less than due care without it
is developed by Shavell in a model with only one liability level, and it is not obvious (at
least to me) that it will generalize to a model with multiple levels of liability and thus an
opportunity for the injurer to purchase partial coverage that averts insolvency in some
states of nature but not others.
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levels of liability. I do not believe that the analysis would change in any
important way if the model allowed for an arbitrarily large number of
possible liability judgments following the accident. A conflict of interest
between the insurer and the insured would still arise under the no duty
rule when the insured purchased less than full coverage, and a critical
level of coverage would still exist for many parameter values under the
Crisci and strict liability rules where the plaintiff's returns to trial were
equal to the policy limits yet below the expected liability judgment.
A related complication concerns the fact that many insurance policies
cover a variety of accidents, each of which has a different probability
distribution of liability judgments associated with it. A homeowner's pol-
icy covers a licensee's slip and fall, for example, as well as a bonfire that
spreads next door. An auto policy covers the fender bender in the parking
lot as well as the high-speed head-on collision. The insured's optimization
problem whatever the legal rule in question, therefore, is considerably
more complex than the model suggests. Nevertheless, the insured still
confronts the same essential trade-off under the no duty rule between the
coverage level and liability externalization and under the Crisci or strict
liability rule gains the opportunity to eliminate risk for some accidents
.while still externalizing liability. This is of benefit even if risk remains
for other accidents because no settlement offer within the policy limits
will be forthcoming. It seems unlikely that a richer model in this respect
would destroy any of the central conclusions, though it would no doubt
complicate matters.
C. Social Welfare versus the Parties' Welfare
Even if the Crisci rule or a strict liability rule would benefit insureds
as the model suggests, the model further implies that the social welfare
consequences of these rules are ambiguous. The ambiguity arises because
the effect of the alternative rules on the extent of liability externalization
is uncertain.
When the insured is potentially judgment proof, a number of familiar
inefficiencies can arise under the no duty rule: (a) the insured may bear
excessive risk because the purchase of insurance leads to liability inter-
nalization; (b) on the assumption that liability judgments correctly mea-
sure the social costs caused by the insured's activity, the insured's activ-
ity level may be excessive; (c) on the same assumption, the insured's
care level may be inadequate; and (d) inefficient litigation may occur. A
Crisci rule or strict liability rule will tend to induce more settlements,
especially when it is otherwise difficult for the insured to participate in
settlement, and thus reduce litigation costs. Either rule also tends to shift
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risk from insureds to insurers, a socially desirable result other things
being equal.
Yet, the insured's choice of a policy limit may be greater under the no
duty rule. Roughly speaking, when the elimination of risk is more impor-
tant to the insured than the opportunity to externalize liability, the in-
sured will tend to choose a fairly high level of coverage under the no
duty rule, perhaps high enough that any plausible judgment is within the
policy limit. A Crisci rule or strict liability rule, by contrast, can prod
the insurer to settle within the policy limits at lower levels of coverage,
and coverage may decline in response. Liability externalization increases
accordingly, with a concomitant expansion of the insured's (already ex-
cessive) activity level and reduction of the insured's (already inadequate)
care level.
Whether and to what extent the Crisci rule or a strict liability rule will
reduce coverage as an empirical matter is assuredly unclear. The model
suggests that either an increase or a decrease in coverage is possible and
offers no basis for a prediction as to which effect would dominate. In
addition, if information problems are the reason why insurance contracts
omit to include jointly optimal terms governing the insurer's discretion
in settlement, perhaps the judicial response to conflicts of interest ex post
will be equally unappreciated by most insureds ex ante and thus have no
effect on their choice of a policy limit.
Finally, if the ex ante consequences of the rules under consideration
here are thought to be de minimis because of policyholder ignorance, and
one views the choice among them solely from the ex post perspective,
the welfare ambiguity resolves. Care levels and activity levels are no
longer at issue, and a duty to settle simply induces the insurer to internal-
ize the costs and benefits of a decision to go to trial. Risk for insureds
who do not participate in settlement negotiations will be reduced (here,
risk after the occurrence of an accident), as well the possibility of ineffi-
cient litigation in such cases. Of course, insurance premiums would rise
ex ante, but a well-informed insurance customer would find the increase
worth it. The case for a strict liability rule instead of the Crisci rule
also perhaps strengthens if one assumes that most insureds are blissfully
ignorant of the conflict of interest ex ante, as the provisions of existing
contracts then provide no information about the parties' joint interests.
APPENDIX
"VERSION 2" OF THE CRISCI RULE WHEN THE INSURED WILL CONTRIBUTE
TO SETTLEMENT
If coverage is high enough that the insurer receives an offer within the policy
limits, the insurer will behave as under Version I and accept the offer. The
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difference here lies in the behavior of the insurer in response to an offer that
exceeds the policy limits.
Under both the no duty rule and Version 1 of the Crisci rule, we have assumed
that the insurer is always willing to contribute toward settlement an amount equal
to its expected losses at trial. When the level of coverage is below L, in the
model, the insurer's expected loss at trial in both instances is simply equal to c,
as that amount will be paid to the plaintiff whatever the judgment. Thus, for c -<
L , the insurer is always willing to contribute the policy limits toward settlement,
and the insured must make up the difference between the policy limits and the
plaintiff's settlement demand. This will be true whether the applicable rule is the
no duty rule, Version 1 of the Crisci rule, or Version 2 of the Crisci rule.
Consider, however, the case in which coverage exceeds L I but is nevertheless
below the plaintiff's expected returns to trial. Here the insurer's expected losses
at trial under either the no duty rule or Version 1 of the Crisci rule are less than
c: There is no settlement offer within the policy limits (relevant to Version 1),
and hence under either rule the insurer only pays L 1 < c in the event of the
"low" judgment at trial, min [c, L 2] in the event of the "moderate" judgment,
and c in the event of the high judgment. The insurer is thus unwilling to contribute
the policy limits toward settlement under the no duty rule or Version 1 of the
Crisci rule but is willing to contribute the policy limits under Version 2 of the
Crisci rule. The reason is that the insured can simply offer to make up the differ-
ence between the plaintiff's best offer and the policy limits (which the risk-averse
insured is surely willing to do), and if the insurer then refuses to settle on those
terms, it becomes liable for the entire expected judgment. It will therefore settle
at the policy limit for any choice of coverage that exceeds L 1 but is less than the
plaintiff's best offer.
The insured now faces a much modified optimal coverage problem. For cover-
age below L,, the premium is ac as before. For coverage above L, but below
the plaintiff's expected returns to trial SP, the insurer will always be forced to
settle for the policy limit because the insured can simply make up any difference
between the plaintiff's best offer and the level of coverage. The premium over
this range, therefore, is also cc. Finally, it is plainly not optimal for the insured
to buy coverage in excess of the critical point where coverage first equals the
plaintiff's expected returns to trial, for at that level of coverage the insurer will
pay the entire settlement amount, and any increase in coverage can only increase
the plaintiff's recovery without eliminating risk. This critical level of coverage
will be determined much in the manner as before and will certainly be less than
or equal to L.
As an illustration, consider again the case where ft = c*. The insured will
never want to buy more than this amount of coverage. And, assuming once again
that the insured settles on the most favorable terms possible at lower levels of
coverage, the insured's contribution to settlement for coverage below c* is the
difference between the plaintiff's returns to trial and the policy limit, call them
Si(c). The insured will choose c E [0, c*] to maximize
E{u( )} = (I - ot)u(w - cxc) + otu[(w - otc - Si(c)].
The only coverage level that can be ruled out in the solution is c = c*. Positive
coverage is not guaranteed because insurance is not actuarially fair from the
insured's perspective (it increases the plaintiff's expected recovery with "high"
liability, and thus increases the plaintiff's settlement demand). "Full" coverage
at c* can be ruled out for the same reason.
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Although the details have changed, the basic structure of the solution has not.
The insured again reduces risk while paying (in expected terms) less than the full
judgment. By comparison to the no duty rule, the insured pays somewhat higher
premiums for coverage above LI, but the insured's contribution to settlement is
reduced by a more than offsetting amount in the event of an accident. The reason
why the reduction is more than offsetting is that the premium has risen over part
of the range of coverage, and hence for coverage in that range the plaintiff gets
slightly less at trial in the event of "high" liability, and the settlement demand
falls accordingly. Thus, for some levels of coverage, Version 2 of the Crisci rule
enables the insured to externalize somewhat more of the expected judgment than
the no duty rule. Again, this can only benefit the insured, as can the fact that the
insured shifts wealth from the high wealth state (no accident) to the low wealth
state (accident) at an actuarially fair price. The magnitude of the gains to the
insured are smaller, but their direction remains as before.
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